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Rocks and hard places: development 
research between neoliberal globalism 
and global neoliberalism 
Frans J. Schuurman
Rocks and hard places: introduction
 ‘It was always a bit of a lie that universities were self-governing institutions. 
Nevertheless, what universities suffered during the 1980s and 1990s was pretty 
shameful, as under threat of having their funding cut they allowed themselves to be 
turned into business enterprises, in which professors who had previously carried on 
their enquiries in sovereign freedom were transformed into harried employees 
required to fulfil quotas under the scrutiny of professional managers….. If the spirit 
of the university is to survive…the real university may have to move into people’s 
homes and grant degrees for which the sole backing will be the names of the 
scholars who sign the certificates’ (J.M. Coetzee in Diary of a Bad Year, 2007). 
At the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s development studies in 
several European universities was established in the form of new academic 
institutes. Through time these institutes evolved from a highly differentiated 
amalgam consisting of leftist students and lecturers towards representatives of an 
established academic discipline. Lately, a number of these institutes are 
celebrating or are preparing to celebrate their 35 or 40 years of existence (like 
the IDS in the UK in 2006 and CIDIN in the Netherlands in 2008). It is 
interesting to notice that these celebrations are specifically dedicated to a critical 
introspection which in the case of the IDS resulted in a conference entitled 
Reinventing Development Studies. Also the Dutch CIDIN will use the celebration 
of its 35 years of existence to critically reflect upon the current status and future 
perspectives of development research in general and that of development studies 
in specific. 
There are reasons enough for these introspective exercises because the 
academic and political space wherein development studies moves is fraught with 
rocks and hard places.  
Firstly, there is an undeniable trend that academic institutes in general have to 
increasingly operate according to a market logic. Input and output in terms of the 
number of students, the amount of publications in peer-refereed top of the bill 
journals, the yearly count of large-scale research projects, quotation indexes, 
ratings indicating the academic prestige of universities, etc. are nowadays 
grudgingly accepted as part of academic survival.  
Secondly, this trend seems to stand in contradistinction to the original critical 
contents of the mission and scientific object of development studies. For 
example, it is increasingly difficult to find funds for development research which 
are either not directly related to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) or 
which try to critically assess the whole MDG-related media circus.  
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As such, thirdly, there is an increasing influence of neo-liberal thinking on 
determining the research agenda of development studies, making it increasingly 
difficult to maintain a critical research tradition.  
Fourthly, although on the one hand the geographical scale of development 
studies research nowadays incorporates Eastern and Central European countries, 
and also Western European countries for that matter, on the other hand with 
respect to research in the traditional development countries the geographical 
focus seems to be reduced to Africa (also a consequence of the focus on the 
MDG-issues; if this trend continues we better might rename development studies 
into Africanism).  
Fifthly, globalization (whether as an ontological phenomenon and/or as a 
discourse) has significantly challenged development studies in many respects (cf. 
Schuurman, 2001). Well, there are some reasons to suppose that globalization, 
theoretically that is, has currently turned from a challenge to critical 
development studies into a liability.  
Lastly, interdisciplinarity which always was a hallmark of development 
studies’ approach, has increasingly become under pressure and currently is 
increasingly being substituted by a multidisciplinarity which is quite another sort 
of animal.  
In short, there are enough reasons to indeed critically reflect upon the current 
status of development studies and to specify some of the most threatening rocks 
and hard places. 
Rocks and hard places I: market logic in academia and critical 
theory
In his contribution to a Festschrift of the Mattersburger Kreis für 
Entwicklungspolitik Henry Bernstein (2007:20) vividly illustrates the tension 
between critical theory and the policy-orientedness of development studies. He 
quotes from an advertisement for Research Fellows at the University of 
Manchester’s new Brooks World Poverty Institute of which Joseph Stiglitz is 
Chair: ‘Successful applicants will have a demonstrated capacity to conduct 
innovative and rigorous research that refines and extends our understanding of 
poverty, while also identifying plausible and politically supportable options for 
what might be done to reduce it’ (Bernstein’s emphasis). 
What does it mean for a development studies institute to be functioning in an 
academic setting which is increasingly being invaded by a market logic? As 
mentioned before, in the current academic climate what is considered as 
important is: size (number of PhDs and staff, number of publications, amount of 
students), large-scale research projects (preferably in combination with large 
quantitative data-banks) in combination with outside funding (an indication 
apparently of the relevance of the research activities and at the same time 
thankfully appreciated by the financial bureaucracy of the university), and the 
amount of evaluation missions (in behalf of the Ministry of International 
Development Cooperation and/or Non-Governmental Development 
Organizations in the Northern countries). In practice this means for development 
studies institutes that in order to survive concessions have to be made. Original 
mission statements, which were strongly normatively inspired, increasingly 
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started to act as barriers in the survival strategy. For example, when the current 
Centre for International Development Issues (CIDIN) of the Radboud University 
in Nijmegen (the Netherlands) started functioning in 1973 as the Third World 
Centre, one of the first publications concerned the negative role of multinationals 
in maintaining poverty-related issues in the Third World. The name of Third 
World Centre was changed into CIDIN in the year 2000 as the term Third World 
was considered outdated and in the Dutch academic collective memory too much 
connected to ‘ThirdWorldism’. Currently one of the research projects of CIDIN 
concerns the measurement of the efficiency and impact of development projects 
(in collaboration with a Dutch NGO which is financing this research). The 
purpose of this project is to deliver academically sound advice to NGOs to 
improve their project efficiency and impact.  
In the 1970s, a common view in development studies circles was that 
development projects were an extension of Northern based imperialism (a basic 
view of ‘ThirdWorldists’ or ‘TierMondistas’) or at the most a way to evade more 
fundamental changes in North-South trade relations and political regimes in 
underdeveloped countries themselves. There is in fact little reason to believe that 
currently development cooperation has changed dramatically in its implicit 
intentions. Maybe this is an extreme example, yet it shows a number of dramatic 
shifts that the development studies went through in terms of its explanandum 
(object), explanans (explanatory framework) and subject (methodology). In 
terms of its object development studies (at least in this example but I venture that 
it is a general characteristic) went from a structural analysis of the mechanics of 
underdevelopment to studying the efficiency of development projects. In this 
shift an approach inspired by critical theory was entirely lost. In fact, in general 
the adjective ‘critical’ lost its original meaning. Many development studies 
students nowadays interpret ‘critical’ only in the dictionary sense of the word. In 
addition, the example also shows that there is an historic shift (not only in 
development studies but also in social sciences in general) from structural 
analysis to actor-oriented analysis. Studying c.q. evaluating development 
projects in terms of efficiency and impact means a shift from macro- to micro-
level analysis. Now, there is nothing wrong with actor-oriented analysis as long 
as the structural context is not lost from sight. But this is exactly the point, the 
broader context in project-based evaluation studies remains often outside the 
analytical framework (partly also because it falls outside the sphere of influence 
of the NGOs which finance these studies in the first place). Another example of 
the shift within development studies from structural to actor-oriented analysis is 
the way that concepts like poverty and inequality are looked at. We see here a 
historic shift in the level of analysis from macro to meso to micro. Poverty in the 
Third World used to be conceptualized in terms of differences between rich and 
poor countries. Admittedly, the definition of poverty has been much improved 
through the years (from a purely income-oriented definition to a much broader 
set of indicators) but poverty is now often brought down to an individual 
characteristic with individual solutions (e.g. through micro-credit schemes). This 
trend is also reflected in analytical frameworks like for example the currently 
much favoured livelihood approaches where individual actors are plotted into a 
matrix according to their access (or lack thereof) to assets or different forms of 
capital (financial, social, human, etc.). Now, the livelihood framework is very 
useful to point out the heterogeneity existing within a particular local space, 
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something which has always been a notoriously weak point in critical theory. But 
this can hardly compensate for the lack of an analysis of more structural 
components. In other words, the shift within development studies from research 
inspired by critical theory to research according to a neoliberal agenda is 
accompanied by dramatic shifts in object, subject and explanatory framework.  
Now the above probably are nothing more than the grumblings of an old 
development studies dinosaur. So let me turn to these issues from the student’s 
point of view (i.e. more precisely: my perspective on their perspective). 
Development studies still attracts a sufficient number of students. The reasons 
for studying development studies have not changed over the years. It is a genuine 
concern for the plight of the poor in the Third World, indignation about the 
unequal distribution of resources on a global scale and the urge to do something 
about this. Students also are still very active outside the university although the 
characteristics of their activities have changed somewhat. In the ‘old days’ 
students joined anti-imperialism working groups and as such were well equipped 
with theoretical knowledge which enabled them to discuss Marx’s 18th Brumaire 
on the same level with their professors. Nowadays students join United Nations 
Youth Forums and travel to Washington to meet their peers from other countries 
to discuss good governance. So, extra curricula activities still are there and still 
express a basic concern with the ‘Other’ which goes beyond studying at the 
university. In fact, these activities could be more appreciated than in the old days 
because a lot of students are working about 20 hours per week to earn their 
livelihood. The job market for development studies students is still largely 
composed of employment in the domain of international development 
cooperation although significantly less then before this means being sent 
overseas. Only a small percentage manages to proceed in writing a PhD-thesis. 
Although I mentioned earlier that development studies should not be reduced to 
development management and policy the reality is that a lot of the students end 
up in Ministries of Development Cooperation, NGOs, embassies or international 
development organizations which do nothing else then development 
management and policy-making. Here we have another reason why critical 
theory came increasingly under pressure, i.e. not only as a framework for 
research but also because of the knowledge required by future employers of 
development studies students. Of course the job market wants critical students 
but more in a generalized academic sense of the word. There is a need for 
students who know how to prepare, manage and evaluate development projects, 
who know how to measure efficiency and increase the impact of projects. The 
job market does not need students who think that the Millennium Development 
Goals are the latest example to depoliticize the development debate. All this does 
not mean the students are ignorant of what critical theory is but it seems to be 
more considered as something of the past than of any immediate use in research 
projects or in future jobs. Besides, by now every European university has 
implemented the Bologna Treaty which means that officially the academic 
period for students consists of a 3-year BA followed by a 1-year MA. Time for 
fieldwork is limited which means that students need a pragmatic ‘toolkit’ for 
local level research. Critical theory is rather abstract and needs a lot of 
operationalization to be used in short term micro-level MA-research projects. It 
can be considered as a major challenge for development studies to try to 
reincorporate critical theory into that pragmatic toolkit.  
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Rocks and hard places II: from inter- to multidisciplinarity 
Through time the interdisciplinarity of development studies has become one of 
its most important trademarks which, besides the obvious advantages, also has its 
drawbacks. The big advantage is that the object of development studies is a 
major social problem (let's keep it simple for the moment: widespread poverty in 
the Third World) and social problems in general can only be studied adequately 
from an interdisciplinary perspective. These problems always have economic, 
political and socio-cultural aspects and ditto contextual influencing factors which 
are interrelated among them. It is specifically the attempt to take into account the 
interrelations between these aspects which makes development studies 
interdisciplinary.  
For example, if we study the developmental role of civil society organizations 
(which is one of the hot topics nowadays) and one does not take into account the 
influence on the characteristics of civil society of 1) the type of the political 
regime (e.g. whether it is a weak or a strong state) and 2) the influence of modes 
of production (the relative importance of and the interrelation between a 
capitalist and a non-capitalist mode of production), then only a small part of the 
total picture can be captured. Just looking at a social problem from different 
disciplinary angles would make it multi- but not interdisciplinary.  
The disadvantage of interdisciplinarity is that the training of students in the 
academic field of each of the major sciences which are reflected in the corner 
points of the interdisciplinary triangle (i.e. political science, economy and 
sociology) is sometimes considered insufficient as development studies tries to 
keep various balls in the air at the same time. Development studies students are 
not economists, sociologists or political scientists pur sang yet they compensate 
this lack of specific disciplinary knowledge with a better insight in the 
complexity of developmental problems. Yet, it is not uncommon, although 
mistaken, that development studies is seen as an applied science narrowed down 
to development policy and management. Looking at development studies from 
the outside, specifically given its problem-oriented object definition, it is to be 
expected that its focus seems to be on policy-oriented research, contributing to 
further developmental processes in the Third World. As such, development 
studies is sometimes looked at by the other branches of social sciences as lacking 
in academic status, also because of its interdisciplinary character as discussed 
above. It is, however, a common mistake to reduce development studies to 
development policy and management, thereby emphasizing an empiricist and 
solution-oriented approach to the problem of underdevelopment. The object of 
development studies is much broader, i.e. it takes as its explanandum the 
structural causes of the lack of emancipation of people in the South as well as in 
transitional economies elsewhere and the strategies (at a local, national and 
international scale) which are employed to solve this lack of emancipation. A 
lack of emancipation refers to an inadequate access to material (e.g. income) and 
immaterial (e.g. education) resources which leads to widespread poverty, 
exploitation, inequality and injustice. The emphasis on structural causes does not 
imply just a structuralist approach but combines this with actor-oriented 
perspectives in order not to lose sight of the actors’ views. Strategies to solve the 
lack of emancipation involve various actors in the South as well as in the North: 
social movements, NGOs, and national and international governmental 
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organizations. Of course, this is a subjective definition of development studies 
but one which I feel does more justice to what development studies is all about 
without reducing it to development policy and management. 
A recent addition to the geographical scale of development studies shows that 
besides countries in the South and transitional economies in for example former 
Eastern Europe, also the emancipatory problems in multicultural societies in the 
North are increasingly incorporated into the object of development studies. 
Students of development studies are very much interested in the emancipatory 
problems related to multiculturality in their own societies. Also in this case, an 
interdisciplinary approach is the most awarding. 
Nevertheless, the (short) history of development studies reflects a dialectical 
relationship between the advantage and disadvantage of an interdisciplinary 
approach. In the first place, climbing over the fence of the neighbouring sciences 
can lead to muddy feet. The paradigms and theories which are 'imported' from 
the three major social science disciplines (economy, political science and 
sociology) could for a long time only be fruitfully combined by development 
studies because of their common denominator which is the linch-pin behind the 
interdisciplinarity, i.e. the role of the (nation)state. The bulk of the paradigms 
and theories from these three major domains of the social sciences has its roots 
in the 19th century with an emphasis on the role of the (nation)state in, 
respectively, the establishment of national markets and international trade 
relations, the establishment of democratic governments, and the aim of these 
governments to create a national identity (thereby suppressing other forms of 
identity based, for example, on regional or religious affiliations). In short, 
development studies' interdisciplinarity reflected right from the start the 19th 
century roots of other social sciences with the nation-state as the main actor in 
development processes and as the main geographical referent. These 
paradigmatic views on the role of the (nation)state have changed as we move 
closer to the so-called global era. Globalisation challenges the interdisciplinary 
character of development studies. Many globalisation authors agree on the 
decreasing, or at least changing, economic, political and cultural importance of 
(nation)states. A shift in analytical perspective from the nation-state to 
transnational social space does not make it any easier for the interdisciplinary 
approach of development studies. On the other hand, the ‘global-local’ as the 
new binary has surplus value above the established dichotomies of core-
periphery and developed-underdeveloped exactly because it is less spatial and 
allows for inequality within the binary code. Leo Ching (2000) speculates that 
under globalisation traditional binary models of social analysis and political 
struggle (colonizer-colonized, First World-Third World, centre-periphery) are 
inapplicable to a spatial economy of power irreducible to geographical 
dichotomies. In the same line Appadurai is in favour of a ‘process’ geographies 
instead of a ‘trait’ geographies which considers areas as relatively immobile 
aggregates of traits (values, languages, material practices, ecological adaptations, 
marriage patterns, etc.) with more or less durable boundaries. A process 
geography sees areas as precipitates of various kinds of action, interaction and 
motion (trade, travel, warfare, colonization, exile, etc.). Current area studies, 
says Appadurai, consider areas as permanent associations between space, 
territory and cultural organization. It is not only that the globalisation debate 
gives reason to suppose that the role of the (nation)state has been and still is 
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declining but also that, as a consequence, the former conjunctive dynamic (i.e. 
following the same spatial and time paths) of economy, polity and culture - upon 
which the interdisciplinary character of many a development theory was based - 
has been replaced by a disjunctive dynamic (Appadurai, 1990). In a 
deterritorialised world the nation-state would have lost its role as a connecting 
linch-pin between the economic, political and cultural domains which now 
largely follow their own disjunctive dynamics which are only partly interrelated. 
The traditional interdisciplinary approach of development theories which, for 
example, used to draw upon the interrelation between national economic growth 
and processes of democratisation through the role of the (nation)state is now 
confronted with domains which follow different logics that are not necessarily 
interrelated as they form part of different transnational scopes. For the time being 
development studies seems obliged to withdraw towards a multidisciplinary 
approach (i.e. without a clear theoretical view on the interrelations between the 
economic, political and cultural domains).  
Rocks and hard places III: glob-talk 
‘It is time to tear of the neutral mask of globalization and make visible the raw 
imperialism beneath it’ (David Harvey). 
Allow me to give the basic argument in this short paragraph in the following 
(perhaps overly simplified) proposition: ‘by following the culturalist turn in 
globalization discourses (shortly: glob-talk) development studies has allowed 
itself to be manoeuvred away from critical theory.’
Development studies has wholeheartedly embraced concepts like 
interconnectedness, network of networks, cosmopolitanism, hybridity, 
syncretism, deterritorialization, reterritorialization, glocalization, civil society, 
etc. Political economy seems to have disappeared almost completely in this 
culturalist turn; ‘culture matters’ a la Harrison and Huntington (2000), certainly, 
but not by substituting culture for political economy (cf. Rowbotham). 
Development studies has allowed itself to embrace the Millanium Development 
Goals’ (MDGs) approach to poverty in absolute terms instead of in relative terms 
of power inequality. It has been seduced to accept research projects meant to 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of MDG-related development efforts 
without questioning too much the depoliticizing nature of the MDG-circus. 
Samir Amin has condemned the MDG-project in no uncertain terms as an 
imperialist project: extreme privatization, opening up new fields for the 
expansion of capital within a context of maximum deregulation, and, above all, 
no state interference in economic affairs. In fact, the way that development 
research has been involved with the MDGs is a fine example of what can be 
called academic governmentality in Foucauldian terms, i.e. the MDGs are used 
to discipline development research.  
In the previous paragraphs I have attempted to explain a number of reasons 
why development studies finds itself in this non-critical cul de sac. In the last 
paragraph I will discuss the question whether the concept of neo-imperialism 
offers a way out of this cul de sac. 
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Beyond rocks and hard places: the neo-imperialist route? 
In terms of the old imperialist theories, development originally was about core 
states monopolizing accumulation opportunities. In order to do this, these states 
used to establish at home a social order conducive to capitalist development, but 
at the same time established exploitative relations with colonies and if need be to 
engage in inter-imperialist wars with other core states which tried to protect their 
accumulation opportunities. 
After the WWII the concept of development became used in the aftermath of a 
speech of the US president Harry Truman as a discourse in the context of the 
Cold War to lure nation-states in the Third World into the Western camp. No 
matter the degree of anti-democratic, exploitative, brutal and corrupt 
characteristics of a particular regime it was welcomed with open arms into the 
Western bloc and the development discourse was used to mystify the imperialist 
nature of these relations. The East should be contained with a cordon of 
countries not only to prevent Russia and China to export the communist ideology 
to the Third World but also to ensure access to vital resources and to bloc access 
to these same resources for the communist core countries. Development 
assistance was an important instrument in this imperialist strategy. So, we could 
add, in terms of motives to engage in development assistance, geopolitical 
arguments next to humane or humanist and economic arguments. 
The wars in Korea in the 1950s and in Vietnam in the 1960s (in the latter case 
first by the French and then by the Americans) were essentially geopolitical 
wars. The current involvement of the US in Iraq and Afghanistan is a mixture of 
economic (securing access to oil, in the case of Afghanistan to secure the oil 
pipe-line from Turkmenistan to the Arabian Sea) and geopolitical causes. During 
the so-called Developmentalist Era (which in McMichael’s 2000 interpretation 
extends from the 1940s to the 1970s)) the most abhorrent African and Latin 
American dictatorships were thusly welcomed with open arms into the Western 
bloc. Also the famous US development aid program in the beginning of the 
1960s Alliance for Progress (where the development discourse played an 
important role) under president Kennedy was meant to prevent socialist 
revolutions in Latin America in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution in 1959.  
The decolonization period of the 1960s changed the scene somewhat but not 
enough to change the imperialist relations between North and South. The 
difference being that some European countries lost a privileged entrance to their 
former colonies which further established the hegemony of the US (something 
which led the US to support the decolonization process in order to diminish the 
competitive edge that European economies had based on their cheap access to 
labor and resources in their former colonies).  
Although McMichael divides the post-WW II era into the period of 
Developmentalism (the 1940s-1970s) and the period of Globalism (the 1970s 
and beyond) there are at least two remarkable commonalities which apparently 
escape McMichael. The first one is that Developmentalism as well as Globalism 
are intimately linked to the dynamics of capitalism based as it is on the 
extraction of surplus value from workers (in Marxist jargon called exploitation of 
labour value), on accumulation and class conflict but always within the context 
of a firm belief in endless growth.  
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The second commonality is that these basic characteristics of capitalism lead 
to different institutional arrangements which, however, do not change the basic 
characteristics though and that what binds these institutional arrangements is the 
imperialist relations between core capitalist countries and the periphery. So, 
imperialist relations continued to exist (starting as they did in the 19th century, 
and before that period we had of course colonialism with its own dynamics also 
tied to an incipient capitalist system basically constituted by plunder and at a 
somewhat later stage by unequal exchange) and as such continued to characterize 
in the developmentalist as well as in the globalist era the relations between rich 
and poor countries. 
However, the specific characteristics of these imperialist relations changed 
through time as part of the changing dynamic of capitalism, i.e. from Fordism to 
Post-Fordism. Seen from this perspective Developmentalism as well as 
Globalism are both legitimizing discourses for the imperialist character of 
globalizing capitalism which currently is among other things characterized by 
the subordination of social reproduction to the reproduction of capital (the end of 
the welfare state in the West), the deregulation of the labor market (and we do 
not have to look specifically at developing countries to see how that functions: 
take the latest initiative of the Dutch Cabinet to ease the conditions for laying off 
workers), the globalization of liquid capital, the outsourcing of production to 
cheap labor markets, and the transfer of local capital intended for social services 
into finance capital for global investment (leading to disinvestment in health and 
education).
Now, what are the characteristics of the imperialist structure of globalizing 
capitalism which make some authors (cf. Biel 2000 and Harvey 2005, 2006) 
label this as New Imperialism. Before I come to that it is important to demystify 
at least one so-called globalization myth which is that nation-states have lost 
their erstwhile priority status. This is important because talking about new 
imperialism begs the question about the units of analysis. All the old imperialist 
theories referred to the relations between states or nation-states for that matter. 
If, however, globalization discourses are correct in pointing out the demise of the 
state as a component of neoliberalism and that to understand global capitalism it 
is the market as an institutional arrangement and not the relations between 
nation-states as actors then the imperialist perspective would lose its spatial and 
geopolitical connotations which still belong to its core definition. Mind you, this 
is a tricky issue even among authors which adhere to notions of imperialism such 
as Negri and Hardt (2000) in their best-seller Empire which represents in their 
view a globalized imperialist capitalism without a clear geopolitical center. 
Permit me to dwell not too long in an attempt to demystify this particular 
globalization myth about the demise of the role of nation-states in global 
capitalism by referring to Leo Panitch (2001, p. 10): ‘…globalisation is a 
process that is authored by active states; states that are not victims of the 
process but active agents of making globalisation happen, and are increasingly 
responsible, I would argue, for sustaining it, and even burdened with the 
increasing responsibility of managing its contradictions and crises.’
Panitch adds the following (and we're now already moving into one of the 
characteristics of new imperialism):  
‘… there was certainly a restructuring of states (but not a bypassing of states) in 
relation to: the rapid movement of capital; the changing balance of class forces 
transnationally towards financial capital; the increasing orientation of each of the 
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world’s nation-states to external trade.’ [What was taking place in that context 
was]… a shift in the hierarchy of state apparatus, whereby those state departments 
that were more closely associated with the forces of international capital – 
treasuries, central banks, and so forth – were increasing their status at the cabinet 
table, if you like, vis-à-vis departments of labour or departments of welfare that were 
more closely associated with domestic subordinated class forces.’ (Panitch 2001, p. 
10)
This remark of Panitch makes you think by the way about what this meant for 
the status in the Dutch cabinet of a department like International Development 
Cooperation. Recently, Minister Koenders was invited to give a short talk in 
Nijmegen to shed some light on the outlines of his thoughts on how to structure 
international development cooperation in the new cabinet. What struck me was 
that he cast Dutch international development cooperation primarily in terms of 
tasks which belong to other Ministries: humanitarian aid by sending troops to 
conflict areas (Ministry of Defence), to actively engage in diplomatic missions in 
order to convince the warring parties to gather around a conference table and to 
solve their differences there instead of shooting each other to Kingdom come 
(the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and to establish trade relations with developing 
countries (Ministry of Economic Affairs). What is left for a Ministry of 
International Development Cooperation one wonders.  
Another defining characteristic of new imperialism (in reference to older 
variants of imperialism) is that we have to take a new perspective on inter-
imperialist rivalries which in the past has led to military conflicts between 
imperial powers (such as the first and second World Wars). In spite of the inter-
imperialist economic rivalries between European, American and Japanese capital 
this did not result (as in ‘the old days’) in military conflicts between the 
imperialist powers. What is interesting concerning this particular issue is that 
imperialist powers have joined forces in some military operations in developing 
countries (although not always wholeheartedly) and that, what is considered as a 
specific characteristic of new imperialism, the US has taken the lead in many of 
these military campaigns. Columnist Thomas Friedman approvingly wrote in the 
New York Times in 1999 (March 28) the following: ‘.. The hidden hand of the 
market will never work without the hidden fist . . . and the hidden fist that keeps 
the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies is called the US Army, Air Force, 
Navy and Marine Corps.’ The increasing unilateral political ideology in the US 
(to go for it alone, so to speak, to boycot international treaties to regulate 
environmental pollution, to boycot the International Court of Justice in the 
Hague, etc.) is seen as an important characteristic of the new imperialism. 
According to Michael Peters Europe and the US not necessarily join a common 
strategic culture any more. He quotes neo-conservative Robert Kagan (senior 
associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) who stipulates 
that: 
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 ‘… Americans generally see the world divided between good and evil, between 
friends and enemies…They favour coercion over persuasion, tending towards 
unilateralism. They are less inclined to act through the United Nations or other 
international institutions and more skeptical of international law. By contrast, 
Europeans see a more complex picture. ..They are both more tolerant of failure and 
more patient, preferring peaceful solutions, ‘negotiation, diplomacy, and persuasion 
to coercion.’ (Peters, 2008, p. 9)
At the same time Kagan points out that the EU with the new members from 
Eastern Europe and possibly Turkey could become involved in a process of a 
changing identity, the importance of national priorities and changing 
international agenda's. 
Let me move on to another characteristic of the new imperialism and that is 
that spreading the gospel of democracy and good governance should be 
interpreted as an ideological instrument meant to detain the poor, marginalized, 
exploited masses in the Third World from engaging in political upheavals.
Political transformations through revolutionary changes do not form part of the 
game anymore once a so-called democracy is in place. Once the people are 
convinced that democracy is a sine qua non for progress, and once the political 
elites are convinced that by at least accepting the good governance discourse, 
they are assured of acceptance by the international community, then 
circumstances continue to exist through which surplus value keeps being 
transferred from the periphery to the center either through the production 
process, unequal exchange or consumption of marketed goods. Once the idea is 
established that economic progress can only take place through access to the 
market (also at the individual level, an ideology pushed forward for example by 
micro-credit projects) and that democracy is the best political institutional 
arrangement to guarantee that progress, imperialism has created the necessary 
conditions to solve the ever continuing threat of social conflicts as a result of the 
continuing threats of overaccumulation and falling rates of profit.  
What is specifically interesting here is the role that civil society is supposed to 
play in this whole setup. Much has been said and can be said about the role of 
civil society, specifically in the context of the support it receives through 
international development assistance. Supposedly strengthening civil society
forms part of good governance (empowering the powerless through participation 
in national or local forms of governance). In the context of a perspective from 
new imperialism the notion of civil society is created and supported by 
international donors, and functions (if it functions) as a means to keep a check on 
the state becoming too independent from the international community. Through 
supporting civil society imperialist powers can indirectly influence how 
government policies are shaped. According to Henry Veltmeyer (2005, p.91): 
‘Radical political economists … tend to view NGOs as instruments [Trojan horses], 
oftentimes unwitting and unknowing, of outside interests and regard both economic 
development and democracy as masks for an otherwise hidden agenda: to impose the 
policy and institutional framework of the new world order.’ 
Let me try to sum up the most important characteristics of the new imperialism 
perspective as follows:  
1. There is no reason to agree with one of Ankie Hoogvelts (1997, p. xii) 
notions that ‘The familiar pyramid of the core-periphery hierarchy is no 
longer a geographical but a social division of the world economy.’ There 
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definitely still is a clear geopolitical spatiality attached to the core-periphery 
hierarchy. 
2. At the same time it is true is that the units within the triangular power 
hierarchy are not just nation-states but consist of an amalgam of actors 
among which supranational institutions, multi national corporations, Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and social movements. However, 
nation-states can still be regarded as major actors. 
3. The US take up a primordial position in the globalized power triangle. There 
has been an increasing unilateralism in how the US manifests itself based 
upon its military hegemony. 
4. The dynamics in this power triangle are based upon changing characteristics 
of the capitalist mode of production which produces imperialist, exploitative 
relations between North and South and increasing worldwide inequality 
between and within countries. Imperialism by necessity was and still is 
closely attached to the survival strategy of the capitalist mode of production. 
5. These imperialist relations are sustained on the one hand through an 
ideological legitimation in the form of Globalism and on the other hand 
through direct military intervention, specifically in a unilateral way by the 
US.  
6. Methods of absolute surplus appropriation seem to have returned: 
intensifying work regimes, reducing real wages, and restructuring 
employment away from full-time and secure employment into part-time and 
insecure work, something which David Harvey ( 2005, ch. 4) has labelled as 
accumulation by dispossession which relies on ‘… power, with the use of 
numerous techniques, ranging from stock market manipulation, through debt 
crises, to the commodification of nature, and open military conquest.’
7. Development assistance, currently with the emphasis on good governance, 
democracy and the involvement of civil society depoliticizes the 
development debate and prevents the rise of alternative forms of social order 
with an emancipatory potential for the world’s poor. 
So, does new imperialism offer interesting perspectives to development studies, 
wedged as it is between global neoliberalism and neoliberal globalism? From the 
point of view of critical theory the answer is potentially affirmative. However, 
there are a number of drawbacks attached to adopt new imperialism as a 
paradigm for development studies in the 21st century. To conclude this chapter 
let me mention these drawbacks in arbitrary order: 
1. In building up a scientific paradigmatic perspective based on the concept of 
new imperialism one has to take care not to be dragged into conspiracy-like 
theories which are often fascinating but cannot form the basis of a 
reconstruction of critical development studies. However, the same, can often 
be said about globalization theories which have been labelled by Justin 
Rosenberg (2000) as complete follies.
2. The second drawback is that the new imperialist perspective in order to lead 
to empirical research, has to be operationalized. In other words, if new 
imperialism exists at a paradigmatic level it should be connected to middle-
range critical theories to enable research ‘on the ground’. There are some 
examples of how to do that but it needs more systematic attention. An 
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analysis of power relations is undoubtedly a central element in such an 
exercise. For example, research focussed on local government and the 
participation of the local community through participatory budgets could be 
organized by using concepts of Gramsci and Foucault where power relations 
within the local community and between the local community and local and 
or national governments is central instead of using a frame of analysis 
inspired by the likes of Robert Putnam who focus on social capital.  
3. If new imperialism, together with radical political economy and critical 
theory, is incorporated into the academic curriculum of development studies 
there will be issues of strategy and tactics involved. Rocks and Hard Places 
mentioned in the previous paragraphs make a cautious routing necessary. 
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